Humans are a unique species, like all species are in their own right. One way in which we are distinct from other species is that we have devised technologies that can detect stimuli we are unable to sense on our own, as we are limited by our biology. For example, we are limited in the types of wavelengths we can perceive with our eyes. We can see the seven colors of what we call the rainbow, but this visible light accounts for only a portion of the total light in the universe. Other organisms, such as pit vipers, have infrared or “heat” vision, meaning they can perceive infrared rays, which have longer wavelengths than visible light rays. “Heat vision” is a misleading term, though, since the viper actually detects infrared light not with its eyes, but rather via thermo-sensitive pits on its head. (Map of Life - "Infrared detection in animals"). This ability allows the snake to sense the temperature difference between moving warm-blooded prey and its surroundings, increasing the snake’s accuracy in striking (Zyga). Although humans cannot perceive infrared light in the same way pit vipers can, we have created thermal imaging devices such as night vision goggles, which utilize infrared light. Thus, we describe infrared light, “not in terms of the impressions it makes on our senses, but in terms of its more general effects and of properties detectable by means other than the human senses” (Nagel 5).
Now, imagine that you are having a conversation with a pit viper. It is nighttime, and you’re wearing your thermal imaging night vision goggles. You both notice a warm figure moving in the grass a few yards away—a field mouse, perhaps. The viper asks you if you see it, and you say that you can. Both you and the snake are detecting the same thing (that is, a thermal difference between the mouse and its surroundings), but you are doing so in different ways. In this case, the snake has the “phenomenal point of view,” meaning that she can experience the phenomenon of what it is like to perceive infrared rays via a sense organ. No matter how detailed a description she gives you of what this is like, you can never really know what this sensation is like, though, because you simply are not a snake. Because you are a human with human biological limits, you can only experience infrared rays as your night vision goggles display the information in terms of light visible to humans (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Thermal imaging night vision goggles display infrared information as images that are visible to humans. (Image source: physicscentral.com)
Now, imagine that you are having a conversation with a pit viper. It is nighttime, and you’re wearing your thermal imaging night vision goggles. You both notice a warm figure moving in the grass a few yards away—a field mouse, perhaps. The viper asks you if you see it, and you say that you can. Both you and the snake are detecting the same thing (that is, a thermal difference between the mouse and its surroundings), but you are doing so in different ways. In this case, the snake has the “phenomenal point of view,” meaning that she can experience the phenomenon of what it is like to perceive infrared rays via a sense organ. No matter how detailed a description she gives you of what this is like, you can never really know what this sensation is like, though, because you simply are not a snake. Because you are a human with human biological limits, you can only experience infrared rays as your night vision goggles display the information in terms of light visible to humans (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Thermal imaging night vision goggles display infrared information as images that are visible to humans. (Image source: physicscentral.com)
Please keep this little narrative in mind while reading the following quote from Thomas Nagel’s famous essay, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”:
"We appear to be faced with a general difficulty about psychophysical reduction. In other areas the process of reduction is a move in the direction of greater objectivity, toward a more, accurate view of the real nature of things. This is accomplished by reducing our dependence on individual or species-specific points of view toward the object of investigation. We describe it not in terms of the impressions it makes on our senses, but in terms of its more general effects and of properties detectable by means other than the human senses. The less it depends on a specifically human viewpoint, the more objective is our description…
"Experience itself however, does not seem to fit the pattern. The idea of moving from appearance to reality seems to make no sense here. What is the analogue in this case to pursuing a more objective understanding of the same phenomena by abandoning the initial subjective viewpoint toward them in favour of another that is more objective but concerns the same thing? Certainly it appears unlikely that we will get closer to the real nature of human experience by leaving behind the particularity of our human point of view and striving for a description in terms accessible to beings that could not imagine what it was like to be us. If the subjective character of experience is fully comprehensible only from one point of view, then any shift to greater objectivity—that is, less attachment to a specific viewpoint—does not take us nearer to the real nature of the phenomenon: it take us farther away from it". (Nagel 5)
In the sections of this paper to follow, I will explain what is meant by “psychophysical reduction” and “the subjective character of experience” in the context of the above passage. I will then illustrate the argument that all the physical or objective truths about a given experience may not necessarily constitute the whole truth of that experience. After that, I will present a physicalist counter-argument that psychological/phenomenal/conscious events may well be physical in nature. Finally, I will conclude that even if physicalism (specifically, type identity theory) is correct in claiming that all psychological/phenomenal/conscious events are physical in nature, a purely physical description of a given event cannot convey the subjectivity or particularity of that event.
Psychophysical Reduction
If one thing (B) is reducible to another (A), it can be said that B is “nothing over and above” or “nothing but” A, and A is more fundamental than B. For example, if psychology is reducible to biology, then psychology is really nothing but biology. Furthermore, if biology can be reduced to chemistry, and chemistry to physics, then one can conclude that psychology is reducible to—or nothing but—physics, and physics is more fundamental than psychology. This example can be depicted as a layered structure as follows (Figure 2):
Figure 2. This depiction shows a fundamentality hierarchy in which the lower layers consist of theories that are more fundamental than those occupying the top layers. The more fundamental a theory is, the more objective its terms are.
"We appear to be faced with a general difficulty about psychophysical reduction. In other areas the process of reduction is a move in the direction of greater objectivity, toward a more, accurate view of the real nature of things. This is accomplished by reducing our dependence on individual or species-specific points of view toward the object of investigation. We describe it not in terms of the impressions it makes on our senses, but in terms of its more general effects and of properties detectable by means other than the human senses. The less it depends on a specifically human viewpoint, the more objective is our description…
"Experience itself however, does not seem to fit the pattern. The idea of moving from appearance to reality seems to make no sense here. What is the analogue in this case to pursuing a more objective understanding of the same phenomena by abandoning the initial subjective viewpoint toward them in favour of another that is more objective but concerns the same thing? Certainly it appears unlikely that we will get closer to the real nature of human experience by leaving behind the particularity of our human point of view and striving for a description in terms accessible to beings that could not imagine what it was like to be us. If the subjective character of experience is fully comprehensible only from one point of view, then any shift to greater objectivity—that is, less attachment to a specific viewpoint—does not take us nearer to the real nature of the phenomenon: it take us farther away from it". (Nagel 5)
In the sections of this paper to follow, I will explain what is meant by “psychophysical reduction” and “the subjective character of experience” in the context of the above passage. I will then illustrate the argument that all the physical or objective truths about a given experience may not necessarily constitute the whole truth of that experience. After that, I will present a physicalist counter-argument that psychological/phenomenal/conscious events may well be physical in nature. Finally, I will conclude that even if physicalism (specifically, type identity theory) is correct in claiming that all psychological/phenomenal/conscious events are physical in nature, a purely physical description of a given event cannot convey the subjectivity or particularity of that event.
Psychophysical Reduction
If one thing (B) is reducible to another (A), it can be said that B is “nothing over and above” or “nothing but” A, and A is more fundamental than B. For example, if psychology is reducible to biology, then psychology is really nothing but biology. Furthermore, if biology can be reduced to chemistry, and chemistry to physics, then one can conclude that psychology is reducible to—or nothing but—physics, and physics is more fundamental than psychology. This example can be depicted as a layered structure as follows (Figure 2):
Figure 2. This depiction shows a fundamentality hierarchy in which the lower layers consist of theories that are more fundamental than those occupying the top layers. The more fundamental a theory is, the more objective its terms are.
The reduction of psychological to physical theories is called psychophysical reduction. In the words of John Bickle, “Psychophysical reduction is, at bottom, a thesis about the ontological nature of psychological kinds. Its fundamental assertion is that psychological states, properties, and events are physical states, properties, and events: “are” in the sense of contingent identity, with the relevant physical states being neural states in our case” (67, 68). The theory of psychophysical reduction is a physicalist one. Physicalism is the philosophical doctrine that there are no things other than physical things, or that there exists nothing that extends beyond its physical properties. Within physicalism, type identity theory articulates the idea that mental events (or psychological events or conscious events—the terminology varies) just are physical events presented differently.
The Subjective Character of Experience
“We describe [an object of investigation] not in terms of the impressions it makes on our senses, but in terms of its more general effects and of properties detectable by means other than the human senses. The less it depends on a specifically human viewpoint, the more objective is our description” (Nagel 5). So, as you descend the fundamentality hierarchy in Figure 2, the theories become more objective. For example, a psychological description of “pain” relies on a “specifically human viewpoint”. In psychology, pain is defined as “A diffuse, measurable subjective and variably uncomfortable emotional response to noxious stimuli” (Bunney, Reist, and Hetrick 1). In physics, however, “pain” can simply be defined as c-fibers firing in the brain (if c-fibers firing in the brain is the relevant kind of neural process that corresponds to the conscious mental state “pain”) (Byrne 1). This physical definition of pain may be more objective that the psychological definition, but how does it help us understand the experience of pain?
The physical definition of pain as c-fibers firing certainly does not seem to give us what Nagel calls “a more accurate view of the real nature of [pain]”. In this case, it just doesn’t seem true that pain is nothing but c-fibers firing. Intuitively, it appears that there must be something missing from the physical definition of pain, and indeed there is. There is something else accompanying the firing of c-fibers within the brain: the subjective character of pain or what it is like to experience pain. The subjective character of experience is associated with a first-person point of view and so cannot be described in objective terms, as it would then cease to be subjective.
Why the Objective Truth is Not the Whole Truth: The Mary Case and The Explanatory Gap
Even if it were possible to describe every mental state, property, and event in purely physical terms, that wouldn’t help us understand the phenomenology of those mental states, properties, and events. This concept is illustrated in the narrative in the beginning of this paper: describing infrared light in physical terms does not get us any closer to understanding what it really feels like to perceive infrared waves in the way that a pit viper does. Another example of this concept is Frank Jackson’s famous “Mary case,” also known as the knowledge argument (Alter – “The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism”):
Mary is the victim of some hypothetical experiment, and she has been raised in an entirely black-and-white environment. She has never seen any color. We can pretend that she has never even seen the color of her own skin, hair, or eyes, and that she was raised in a completely black-and-white room with no windows or mirrors, and she has worn something like cone similar to the ones that pets wear post-surgery, so she basically has the viewpoint of a floating head. We can stipulate that she does not dream in color. We can even imagine that she’s never done that thing where you close your eyes and look at a bright light and you see colors on the insides of your eyelids. So, Mary has never experienced what it is like for “light receptors within the eye [to] transmit messages to the brain, which produces the familiar [but not familiar to Mary] sensations of color” (Pantone - “How Do We See Color?”). But, since books are printed in black-and-white, Mary has read up on colors. She’s learned all about what color is. She understands the biology and physics of color. People have even described it to her in terms of other sensory perceptions by saying things like, “it looks the way hot things feel, or the way a C note sounds on the piano.” Mary knows that fire engines and tomatoes and cardinals are red; however, she’s only seen black-and-white photos of them. Nonetheless, Mary knows all of the physical truths regarding the color red.
When Mary is finally freed from her black-and-white prison, she is welcomed to the outside world by all the colors of the rainbow. She sees a fire engine speed by in all its scarlet glory; she recognizes a rose by its familiar shape, and notices that it too is red. Despite the fact that she already had all the physical or objective knowledge of “red” she clearly has gained some further knowledge by finally seeing the color red. That is, she has learned some new truth about the color red that is phenomenal rather than physical in nature, and that she was not able to deduce a priori. You could say that before, Mary knew what “red” is, but she didn’t really know what red is. Now that she’s had the subjective phenomenal experience of seeing red, though, she really does know what red is, fully and completely. She now understands not only “red,” but also what it’s like to see red.
The point of the Mary case is to show that even a complete physical definition of something such as the color red still leaves something out: the subjective character of the experience “seeing red”. Because it is subjective, not objective, the phenomenological feeling of seeing red, or the “subjective character” of the experience, cannot be reduced to physics. As Nagel says in the aforementioned passage, “Certainly it appears unlikely that we will get closer to the real nature of human experience by leaving behind the particularity of our human point of view and striving for a description in terms accessible to beings that could not imagine what it was like to be us” (5). I interpreted “terms accessible to beings that could not imagine what it was like to be us” to mean “physical terms”. What is meant by “the ‘real’ nature of human experience” is up for debate, but I will not discuss that topic in this paper. It seems what Nagle is saying here is that ignoring the subjectivity or “particularity” of an experience in favor of a purely physical description of that experience leaves something out, and that a description of a subjective experience in objective terms will always be lacking something integral to the experience, so it will fail to explain what the experience was really like.
The explanatory gap, illustrated by the Mary case, is a philosophical problem that describes the inability of a complete physical description of a conscious event (like experiencing pain or seeing red) to provide its audience with a full understanding of the subjective phenomena of consciousness. In regards to the Mary case, the explanatory gap is the “gap” between knowing what “red” is and knowing what it is like to see red. “If the subjective character of experience is fully comprehensible only from one point of view,” Nagel writes (a subjective, first-person or ego POV, I assume), “then any shift to greater objectivity—that is, less attachment to a specific viewpoint—does not take us nearer to the real nature of the phenomenon: it take us farther away from it” (5). Here, Nagel is discussing the crux of the explanatory gap. Even a complete physical description of an experience (such as what it is like to be a bat, what it is like to detect infrared light in the way a pit viper can, what it is like to see red, or what it is like to feel pain) can never represent a first-person point of view, and so cannot convey subjectivity.
Maybe Mary Didn’t Have All the Physical Knowledge
One of the foundations of the Mary case is that she already possessed all of the physical knowledge regarding the color red before ever seeing it. The question arises: could a person posses all of the physical knowledge concerning the color red without ever seeing it? Seeing color is a physical process, one which Mary understands as “light receptors within the eye transmit messages to the brain, which produces the sensations of color” (Pantone - “How Do We See Color?). But, it is arguable that because she can understand this physical process on paper, illustrated by Figure 3 below, doesn’t mean she automatically has physical knowledge of color after all, for she has not experienced that physical process for herself first-hand. Yes, she may be able to grasp the concept of how a human eye works and has the ability to see color, but she does not really know what it physically (or phenomenologically) feels like for her own eyes to take in light and send color-information to her brain. Perhaps the phenomenal subjective experience of seeing red counts as physical knowledge.
Figure 3. An example of a diagram that Mary might have seen, explaining the physical phenomenon of color vision. (Image source: http://coloriasto.blogspot.com/2009/11/first-successful-color-movie.html)
The Subjective Character of Experience
“We describe [an object of investigation] not in terms of the impressions it makes on our senses, but in terms of its more general effects and of properties detectable by means other than the human senses. The less it depends on a specifically human viewpoint, the more objective is our description” (Nagel 5). So, as you descend the fundamentality hierarchy in Figure 2, the theories become more objective. For example, a psychological description of “pain” relies on a “specifically human viewpoint”. In psychology, pain is defined as “A diffuse, measurable subjective and variably uncomfortable emotional response to noxious stimuli” (Bunney, Reist, and Hetrick 1). In physics, however, “pain” can simply be defined as c-fibers firing in the brain (if c-fibers firing in the brain is the relevant kind of neural process that corresponds to the conscious mental state “pain”) (Byrne 1). This physical definition of pain may be more objective that the psychological definition, but how does it help us understand the experience of pain?
The physical definition of pain as c-fibers firing certainly does not seem to give us what Nagel calls “a more accurate view of the real nature of [pain]”. In this case, it just doesn’t seem true that pain is nothing but c-fibers firing. Intuitively, it appears that there must be something missing from the physical definition of pain, and indeed there is. There is something else accompanying the firing of c-fibers within the brain: the subjective character of pain or what it is like to experience pain. The subjective character of experience is associated with a first-person point of view and so cannot be described in objective terms, as it would then cease to be subjective.
Why the Objective Truth is Not the Whole Truth: The Mary Case and The Explanatory Gap
Even if it were possible to describe every mental state, property, and event in purely physical terms, that wouldn’t help us understand the phenomenology of those mental states, properties, and events. This concept is illustrated in the narrative in the beginning of this paper: describing infrared light in physical terms does not get us any closer to understanding what it really feels like to perceive infrared waves in the way that a pit viper does. Another example of this concept is Frank Jackson’s famous “Mary case,” also known as the knowledge argument (Alter – “The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism”):
Mary is the victim of some hypothetical experiment, and she has been raised in an entirely black-and-white environment. She has never seen any color. We can pretend that she has never even seen the color of her own skin, hair, or eyes, and that she was raised in a completely black-and-white room with no windows or mirrors, and she has worn something like cone similar to the ones that pets wear post-surgery, so she basically has the viewpoint of a floating head. We can stipulate that she does not dream in color. We can even imagine that she’s never done that thing where you close your eyes and look at a bright light and you see colors on the insides of your eyelids. So, Mary has never experienced what it is like for “light receptors within the eye [to] transmit messages to the brain, which produces the familiar [but not familiar to Mary] sensations of color” (Pantone - “How Do We See Color?”). But, since books are printed in black-and-white, Mary has read up on colors. She’s learned all about what color is. She understands the biology and physics of color. People have even described it to her in terms of other sensory perceptions by saying things like, “it looks the way hot things feel, or the way a C note sounds on the piano.” Mary knows that fire engines and tomatoes and cardinals are red; however, she’s only seen black-and-white photos of them. Nonetheless, Mary knows all of the physical truths regarding the color red.
When Mary is finally freed from her black-and-white prison, she is welcomed to the outside world by all the colors of the rainbow. She sees a fire engine speed by in all its scarlet glory; she recognizes a rose by its familiar shape, and notices that it too is red. Despite the fact that she already had all the physical or objective knowledge of “red” she clearly has gained some further knowledge by finally seeing the color red. That is, she has learned some new truth about the color red that is phenomenal rather than physical in nature, and that she was not able to deduce a priori. You could say that before, Mary knew what “red” is, but she didn’t really know what red is. Now that she’s had the subjective phenomenal experience of seeing red, though, she really does know what red is, fully and completely. She now understands not only “red,” but also what it’s like to see red.
The point of the Mary case is to show that even a complete physical definition of something such as the color red still leaves something out: the subjective character of the experience “seeing red”. Because it is subjective, not objective, the phenomenological feeling of seeing red, or the “subjective character” of the experience, cannot be reduced to physics. As Nagel says in the aforementioned passage, “Certainly it appears unlikely that we will get closer to the real nature of human experience by leaving behind the particularity of our human point of view and striving for a description in terms accessible to beings that could not imagine what it was like to be us” (5). I interpreted “terms accessible to beings that could not imagine what it was like to be us” to mean “physical terms”. What is meant by “the ‘real’ nature of human experience” is up for debate, but I will not discuss that topic in this paper. It seems what Nagle is saying here is that ignoring the subjectivity or “particularity” of an experience in favor of a purely physical description of that experience leaves something out, and that a description of a subjective experience in objective terms will always be lacking something integral to the experience, so it will fail to explain what the experience was really like.
The explanatory gap, illustrated by the Mary case, is a philosophical problem that describes the inability of a complete physical description of a conscious event (like experiencing pain or seeing red) to provide its audience with a full understanding of the subjective phenomena of consciousness. In regards to the Mary case, the explanatory gap is the “gap” between knowing what “red” is and knowing what it is like to see red. “If the subjective character of experience is fully comprehensible only from one point of view,” Nagel writes (a subjective, first-person or ego POV, I assume), “then any shift to greater objectivity—that is, less attachment to a specific viewpoint—does not take us nearer to the real nature of the phenomenon: it take us farther away from it” (5). Here, Nagel is discussing the crux of the explanatory gap. Even a complete physical description of an experience (such as what it is like to be a bat, what it is like to detect infrared light in the way a pit viper can, what it is like to see red, or what it is like to feel pain) can never represent a first-person point of view, and so cannot convey subjectivity.
Maybe Mary Didn’t Have All the Physical Knowledge
One of the foundations of the Mary case is that she already possessed all of the physical knowledge regarding the color red before ever seeing it. The question arises: could a person posses all of the physical knowledge concerning the color red without ever seeing it? Seeing color is a physical process, one which Mary understands as “light receptors within the eye transmit messages to the brain, which produces the sensations of color” (Pantone - “How Do We See Color?). But, it is arguable that because she can understand this physical process on paper, illustrated by Figure 3 below, doesn’t mean she automatically has physical knowledge of color after all, for she has not experienced that physical process for herself first-hand. Yes, she may be able to grasp the concept of how a human eye works and has the ability to see color, but she does not really know what it physically (or phenomenologically) feels like for her own eyes to take in light and send color-information to her brain. Perhaps the phenomenal subjective experience of seeing red counts as physical knowledge.
Figure 3. An example of a diagram that Mary might have seen, explaining the physical phenomenon of color vision. (Image source: http://coloriasto.blogspot.com/2009/11/first-successful-color-movie.html)
Type identity theory holds that types of mental events (e.g. pain) are literally identical to types of brain states (e.g. c-fibers firing) (Schneider – “Identity Theory”). If type identity theory is true in the Mary case, then that phenomenal subjective experience of seeing red would indeed count as “physical knowledge” because that conscious process “seeing red” is just a physical process (also “seeing red”) being presented from a different viewpoint, namely the phenomenological point of view. Following this line of reasoning, Mary wouldn’t and couldn’t have possessed all of the physical knowledge regarding the color red without ever having seen it. And so, the Mary case is flawed in contending that Mary had all the physical knowledge of the color red prior to her actually seeing it.
The Mary Case Remains Strong
The foundation of the knowledge argument is that Mary already knew all physical facts, but if the subjective experience of seeing red is a physical fact, then she didn’t really know all the physical facts! If type identity theory is true in the Mary case, then it is wrong to include Mary’s possession of all the physical truths regarding the color red as a premise for the knowledge argument. Nonetheless, it seems clear that upon leaving the black-and-white environment, Mary gains something that her objective viewpoint could not make visible to her. That is, she gains an understanding of what it is like to see red; she learns the subjective character of that experience.
Despite the possibility that Mary did not leave the black-and-white room with all the physical knowledge about the color red, her objective understanding of “red” was incomplete until she stepped outside for the first time and saw that bright, shiny, crimson fire engine roll by, seeing the color red at last. Previous to her finally seeing the color red, she could not fully comprehend the idea of “red,” because colors simply can’t be described comprehensively in black-and-white terms. One cannot fully comprehend the phenomenology of an event without a subjective experience of that event. Even if physicalism (specifically, type identity theory) is correct in claiming that psychological/phenomenal/conscious events are physical in nature, an objective and purely physical description of a given event cannot convey the subjectivity or particularity of that event, and as Nagel says: “any shift to greater objectivity…does not take us nearer to the real nature of the phenomenon: it take us farther away from it” (5).
Works Cited
Alter, Torin. "The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Web. 9 Dec. 2014. <http://www.iep.utm.edu/know-arg/#H4>.
Bickle, John. "New Wave Psychophysical Reductionism and the Methodological Caveats." JSTOR. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1 Mar. 1996. Web. 9 Dec. 2014.
Byrne, Alex. "Handout 7: The Identity Theory." Course Materials for 24.09 Minds and Machines, Fall 2011. MIT Open Courseware (http://ocw.mit.edu/), Massachusetts Institute of Technology., 1 Jan. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2014. <http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/linguistics-and-philosophy/24-09-minds-and-machines-fall-2011/study-materials/MIT24_09F11_identity.pdf>.
Bunney, M.D., William, Christopher Reist, M.D., and William Hetrick, Ph.D. "Psychological Pain: A Working Definition." Web. 9 Dec. 2014. <http://www.ccalac.org/files/Education/Symposium/PPT/Steven Mee PPT 2012 [Compatibility Mode].pdf>.
"How Do We See Color?" Graphics. Pantone. Web. 9 Dec. 2014. <http://www.pantone.com/pages/pantone/Pantone.aspx?pg=19357&ca=29>.
"Map of Life Convergent Evolution Online." "Infrared Detection in Animals”: Map of Life. Web. 9 Dec. 2014. <http://www.mapoflife.org/topics/topic_311_Infrared-detection-in-animals/>.
Nagel, Thomas. "What Is It Like To Be A Bat?" 1 Oct. 1974. Web. 9 Dec. 2014. <http://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/ahyvarin/teaching/niseminar4/Nagel_WhatIsItLikeToBeABat.pdf>.
Schneider, Steven. "Identity Theory." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Web. 9 Dec. 2014. <http://www.iep.utm.edu/identity/>.
Zyga, Lisa. "Snakes' Heat Vision Enables Accurate Attacks on Prey." Snakes' Heat Vision Enables Accurate Attacks on Prey. 1 Jan. 2006. Web. 9 Dec. 2014. <http://phys.org/news76249412.html>.
The Mary Case Remains Strong
The foundation of the knowledge argument is that Mary already knew all physical facts, but if the subjective experience of seeing red is a physical fact, then she didn’t really know all the physical facts! If type identity theory is true in the Mary case, then it is wrong to include Mary’s possession of all the physical truths regarding the color red as a premise for the knowledge argument. Nonetheless, it seems clear that upon leaving the black-and-white environment, Mary gains something that her objective viewpoint could not make visible to her. That is, she gains an understanding of what it is like to see red; she learns the subjective character of that experience.
Despite the possibility that Mary did not leave the black-and-white room with all the physical knowledge about the color red, her objective understanding of “red” was incomplete until she stepped outside for the first time and saw that bright, shiny, crimson fire engine roll by, seeing the color red at last. Previous to her finally seeing the color red, she could not fully comprehend the idea of “red,” because colors simply can’t be described comprehensively in black-and-white terms. One cannot fully comprehend the phenomenology of an event without a subjective experience of that event. Even if physicalism (specifically, type identity theory) is correct in claiming that psychological/phenomenal/conscious events are physical in nature, an objective and purely physical description of a given event cannot convey the subjectivity or particularity of that event, and as Nagel says: “any shift to greater objectivity…does not take us nearer to the real nature of the phenomenon: it take us farther away from it” (5).
Works Cited
Alter, Torin. "The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Web. 9 Dec. 2014. <http://www.iep.utm.edu/know-arg/#H4>.
Bickle, John. "New Wave Psychophysical Reductionism and the Methodological Caveats." JSTOR. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1 Mar. 1996. Web. 9 Dec. 2014.
Byrne, Alex. "Handout 7: The Identity Theory." Course Materials for 24.09 Minds and Machines, Fall 2011. MIT Open Courseware (http://ocw.mit.edu/), Massachusetts Institute of Technology., 1 Jan. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2014. <http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/linguistics-and-philosophy/24-09-minds-and-machines-fall-2011/study-materials/MIT24_09F11_identity.pdf>.
Bunney, M.D., William, Christopher Reist, M.D., and William Hetrick, Ph.D. "Psychological Pain: A Working Definition." Web. 9 Dec. 2014. <http://www.ccalac.org/files/Education/Symposium/PPT/Steven Mee PPT 2012 [Compatibility Mode].pdf>.
"How Do We See Color?" Graphics. Pantone. Web. 9 Dec. 2014. <http://www.pantone.com/pages/pantone/Pantone.aspx?pg=19357&ca=29>.
"Map of Life Convergent Evolution Online." "Infrared Detection in Animals”: Map of Life. Web. 9 Dec. 2014. <http://www.mapoflife.org/topics/topic_311_Infrared-detection-in-animals/>.
Nagel, Thomas. "What Is It Like To Be A Bat?" 1 Oct. 1974. Web. 9 Dec. 2014. <http://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/ahyvarin/teaching/niseminar4/Nagel_WhatIsItLikeToBeABat.pdf>.
Schneider, Steven. "Identity Theory." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Web. 9 Dec. 2014. <http://www.iep.utm.edu/identity/>.
Zyga, Lisa. "Snakes' Heat Vision Enables Accurate Attacks on Prey." Snakes' Heat Vision Enables Accurate Attacks on Prey. 1 Jan. 2006. Web. 9 Dec. 2014. <http://phys.org/news76249412.html>.