Mae DesTroismaisons
The Meaning of Freedom
March 10, 2014
Professor Randall Harp
In his essay, Libertarianism, Robert Kane argues that free will is required for moral responsibility and that the idea of free will is incompatible with the idea of an entirely determined universe. He explains that free will exists at times when we have ultimate responsibility for our actions. Furthermore, he writes that this ultimate responsibility can only arise if there is some indeterminism has existed in the past.
First, it is important to understand what Kane means by “free will,” for it has different meanings to different philosophers. Kane’s idea of free will takes the form of the “alternate possibilities” perspective (AP), which he illustrates with his “garden of forking paths” (6). Basically, what AP and the garden of forking paths delineate is that at certain points in time when a person makes a choice, it is possible that they could have chosen or done otherwise. AP is at odds with the idea of determinism, which argues the exact opposite: that there is no garden of forking paths; rather, there is one single straight line of events, all of which are destined to occur as results of the past and the laws of nature. Kane’s goal is to show that AP is possible, and therefore, free will (and thus, moral responsibility) and determinism cannot coexist.
Second, I will clarify the term “ultimate responsibility.” Ultimate responsibility (UR) means that for a person to be responsible for something (for one to be held blameworthy or praiseworthy for something), they must be the ultimate author of that thing. In other words, a person must be accountable for an action they perform or for the state of mind, personal characteristics, or “anything that is a sufficient cause or motive for the action’s occurring” (14).
Kane points out that that UR does not mean that people have alternate possibilities (can do otherwise) in all situations, but that AP exists in certain situations in which “self-forming actions” (SFAs), or acts that mold personal character are performed (14). An example of an SFA similar to Kane’s businesswoman example is as follows: Ben found a wallet on the ground, and inside there was one hundred dollars and the driver’s license of the person it belongs to. Ben underwent an internal struggle between his conscience, which told him he should return the wallet and its contents to its owner, and his greed, which told him he should keep the hundred dollars. (Note that this situation is an instance of indeterminism, because the outcome of the event is uncertain.) Ben wanted two different things: to return the wallet and to keep it. There was a forking path before him, and he had to “make an effort of will,” as Kane would say (26), to overcome the temptation to keep the wallet. If he did not overcome his greed, it was because he “did not allow [his] effort to succeed” since while he willed to rise above his greed, he also willed to fail to do so. When Ben decided to return the wallet, he made a determinate choice out of indeterminate efforts; that is, Kane’s words, he “[made] one set of competing reasons or motives prevail over the others then and there by deciding” (27).
In the above instance, the indeterminism that arises from Ben’s conflicting wills serves as an obstacle that he must conquer in order to make a choice. But, whichever choice he made (whether he decided to return the wallet or keep it) was made purposefully, and not randomly or accidentally because his decision was willed either way—it was made forreasons, and he endorsed those reasons at the time (29). No matter which choice he made, he would make the choice of his own free will and would be ultimately responsible for it, as he would be the author of his action, as opposed so some other agent or mechanism.
It may be true that Ben could not control the past or the laws of nature at the time he made his choice, but just because he could not control what happened beforehand does not mean that he couldn’t control what happened when it happened. When SFAs like Ben’s decision about the wallet occur (when choices are made for reasons that are endorsed), agents gain some control of the future “then and there by deciding” (30). As a result, Ben had what Kane calls “plural voluntary control,” meaning that he could have caused either of the two options that he willed at the time; thus, he could have done otherwise (AP) on purpose and without being coerced (30).
Ultimate responsibility is present in self-forming actions like Ben’s, which are character-building choices that allow people to be held accountable for their acts and to be held responsible for why they, as people, are the way they are. During a self-forming action, an agent has plural voluntary control, and thus, alternate possibilities exist. In cases in which alternate possibilities exist, indeterminism also exists, for “‘indeterminism’ is a technical term that merely rules out deterministic causation, though not causation altogether” (31). Ultimate responsibility is required in order for a person to have free will in addition to alternate possibilities (that a person can do otherwise), or indeterminism. In indeterministic cases in which people can do otherwise, they perform actions of their own free will, and so are ultimately responsible for those actions.
Bibliography
Kane, Robert. “Libertarianism.” Four Views on Free Will. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007. 5-42. Print.
The Meaning of Freedom
March 10, 2014
Professor Randall Harp
In his essay, Libertarianism, Robert Kane argues that free will is required for moral responsibility and that the idea of free will is incompatible with the idea of an entirely determined universe. He explains that free will exists at times when we have ultimate responsibility for our actions. Furthermore, he writes that this ultimate responsibility can only arise if there is some indeterminism has existed in the past.
First, it is important to understand what Kane means by “free will,” for it has different meanings to different philosophers. Kane’s idea of free will takes the form of the “alternate possibilities” perspective (AP), which he illustrates with his “garden of forking paths” (6). Basically, what AP and the garden of forking paths delineate is that at certain points in time when a person makes a choice, it is possible that they could have chosen or done otherwise. AP is at odds with the idea of determinism, which argues the exact opposite: that there is no garden of forking paths; rather, there is one single straight line of events, all of which are destined to occur as results of the past and the laws of nature. Kane’s goal is to show that AP is possible, and therefore, free will (and thus, moral responsibility) and determinism cannot coexist.
Second, I will clarify the term “ultimate responsibility.” Ultimate responsibility (UR) means that for a person to be responsible for something (for one to be held blameworthy or praiseworthy for something), they must be the ultimate author of that thing. In other words, a person must be accountable for an action they perform or for the state of mind, personal characteristics, or “anything that is a sufficient cause or motive for the action’s occurring” (14).
Kane points out that that UR does not mean that people have alternate possibilities (can do otherwise) in all situations, but that AP exists in certain situations in which “self-forming actions” (SFAs), or acts that mold personal character are performed (14). An example of an SFA similar to Kane’s businesswoman example is as follows: Ben found a wallet on the ground, and inside there was one hundred dollars and the driver’s license of the person it belongs to. Ben underwent an internal struggle between his conscience, which told him he should return the wallet and its contents to its owner, and his greed, which told him he should keep the hundred dollars. (Note that this situation is an instance of indeterminism, because the outcome of the event is uncertain.) Ben wanted two different things: to return the wallet and to keep it. There was a forking path before him, and he had to “make an effort of will,” as Kane would say (26), to overcome the temptation to keep the wallet. If he did not overcome his greed, it was because he “did not allow [his] effort to succeed” since while he willed to rise above his greed, he also willed to fail to do so. When Ben decided to return the wallet, he made a determinate choice out of indeterminate efforts; that is, Kane’s words, he “[made] one set of competing reasons or motives prevail over the others then and there by deciding” (27).
In the above instance, the indeterminism that arises from Ben’s conflicting wills serves as an obstacle that he must conquer in order to make a choice. But, whichever choice he made (whether he decided to return the wallet or keep it) was made purposefully, and not randomly or accidentally because his decision was willed either way—it was made forreasons, and he endorsed those reasons at the time (29). No matter which choice he made, he would make the choice of his own free will and would be ultimately responsible for it, as he would be the author of his action, as opposed so some other agent or mechanism.
It may be true that Ben could not control the past or the laws of nature at the time he made his choice, but just because he could not control what happened beforehand does not mean that he couldn’t control what happened when it happened. When SFAs like Ben’s decision about the wallet occur (when choices are made for reasons that are endorsed), agents gain some control of the future “then and there by deciding” (30). As a result, Ben had what Kane calls “plural voluntary control,” meaning that he could have caused either of the two options that he willed at the time; thus, he could have done otherwise (AP) on purpose and without being coerced (30).
Ultimate responsibility is present in self-forming actions like Ben’s, which are character-building choices that allow people to be held accountable for their acts and to be held responsible for why they, as people, are the way they are. During a self-forming action, an agent has plural voluntary control, and thus, alternate possibilities exist. In cases in which alternate possibilities exist, indeterminism also exists, for “‘indeterminism’ is a technical term that merely rules out deterministic causation, though not causation altogether” (31). Ultimate responsibility is required in order for a person to have free will in addition to alternate possibilities (that a person can do otherwise), or indeterminism. In indeterministic cases in which people can do otherwise, they perform actions of their own free will, and so are ultimately responsible for those actions.
Bibliography
Kane, Robert. “Libertarianism.” Four Views on Free Will. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007. 5-42. Print.