Mae DesTroismaisons
The Meaning of Freedom
February 18, 2014
Professor Randall Harp
According to Harry G. Frankfurt in Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, for a person to enjoy free will, “it means that he is free to will what he wants to will, or to have the will he wants” (15). Two conditions must be met in order for a given event to be a product of a person’s free will:
I should start by clarifying some key terms used in the above criteria. What exactly is a will? Furthermore, what does it mean for a will to be free?
A will is also known as an effective desire, or a desire that moves a person to act. A will is comprised of one or more first-order desires, which are “desires[1] to do or not to do one thing or another” (7). First-order desires are simply thoughts that we can act upon directly (to play piano or not to play piano, for example). A person may have multiple (and possibly conflicting) first-order desires at any given time, but the desire or combination of desires that makes them act is their effective desire, orwill. People also have what are called second-order volitions, which are mental situations in which we want a certain desire to be our will. When our second-order volition matches up with our effective desire, then our will is said to be free. We exercise free will when we are moved to act by the desire that we want to be moved to act by. I will try to clarify this with an example:
Imagine that Ellen is learning to play the piano. Ellen really enjoys playing the piano and wants to improve. She is visiting her aunt’s house, and her aunt owns a magnificent grand piano. When Ellen sees her aunt’s beautiful piano, she feels the urge to play it (Ellen has a first-order desire to play the piano). Ellen is trying to improve her piano playing, and she knows that the more often she practices, the better she will get. Thus, she wants to want to play the piano; that is, her second-order volition is to play the piano (she wants to be moved to act by her desire to play the piano). When she sits down on the bench and begins to play, her first-order desire becomes her effective desire (her will) because it is the one that moved her to act. Perhaps Ellen was hungry too, and so also had a first-order desire to eat, but she did not have time to both eat and play piano. Her desire to eat did not become her effective desire because it did not move her to act (she played piano instead of going to find food). So, Ellen’s will is free because her effective desire is to play the piano, and she wanted to be moved by her desire to play the piano. Ellen is playing the piano of her own free will because her effective desire matches her second-order volition. She was free “to have the will [s]he want[ed]” (15).
Looking back to the aforementioned conditions necessary for the exercise of free will, you will see that both stipulations have been met in Ellen’s case. It was her will to play piano (she wanted to do it and she did it) and her will was free when she played (she wanted to be moved to do it by her desire to do it). If it were the case that Ellen was being forced to play the piano even though she didn’t want to (if she was playing despite the fact that she had no first-order desire to do so), for instance, if her parents were making her practice OR ELSE, then her will (that which moved her to act) would not be her own, and she would not be playing as a result of her own free will.
As we have all experienced at one time or another in life, our actions do not always represent our intentions. For example, Walker may intend to quit smoking; however, he is addicted to cigarettes, and so smokes one anyway. He has two conflicting first-order desires (to smoke and to not smoke) and a second-order volition to not smoke (he wants his desire to not smoke to be his effective desire). Despite his intention to not smoke a cigarette, he submits to his addiction and smokes one anyway because his desire to not smoke is weaker than his conflicting desire to smoke. Thus, to smoke a cigarette is Walker’s effective desire, but his effective desire is not what he wanted it to be, and so does not equate to his second-order volition. Because of his addiction, he was not “free to will what he want[ed] to will” (15). Thus, Walker did not smoke a cigarette of his own free will. Although Walker’s effective desire (his will) ended up being to smoke, he did so only because he is helpless against his addiction to cigarettes. This situation is tied to the previous example in which Ellen’s parents force her to play piano against her will, for it cannot be said that Walker’s will is his own. In Frankfurt’s similar example of an unwilling addict, he states: “the force moving him to take the drug is a force other than his own, and that it is not of his own free will but rather against his will that this force moves him to take it” (13).
If the unwilling addict’s will is not his own, then what about the willing addict’s? Frankfurt explores this query too. Suppose that Walker does not intend to quit smoking; rather, he is addicted to cigarettes, but he thinks smoking is cool. He desires to smoke and wants to desire to smoke. He would have a first-order desire to smoke as well as a second-order volition to smoke. In this case, Walker’s will would not be freebecause he is helplessly addicted to cigarettes, and would smoke regardless of whether or not he had a second-order volition to do so. However, according to Frankfurt, Walker would smoke of his own free will in this scenario because he does want to desire smoke, wants to smoke a cigarette, and so smokes one. Thus, he makes his will his own. Walker’s will is out of his control, but is still his own because he has made it so. Unlike the unwilling addict, it is not only because of his addiction that the willing addict smokes.
According to Frankfurt’s definition of free will—“that [a person] is free to will what he wants to will, or to have the will he wants”—whether or not determinism exists is irrelevant. Even if everything is causally determined, and as Sam Harris would say, “our mental lives are simply given to us by the cosmos” it is still possible to have free will under Frankfurt’s definition of the term. However, if your definition of free will is that you must have absolute control of a thought, meaning that you must have been able to control your genetic makeup as well as all environmental factors that influenced the thought and resulting action, then people probably cannot possibly exercise what you call free will. In Frankfurt’s compatibilist argument, though, determinism and free will are not mutually exclusive. He says, “it seems conceivable that it should be causally determined that a person is free to want what he wants to want. If this is conceivable, then it might be causally determined that a person enjoys free will” (20).
Works Cited
Frankfurt, Harry G. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.”The Journal of Philosophy LXVIII.1 (1971): 5-20. JSTOR. Web. 20 Feb. 2014.
Harris, Sam. Free will. New York: Free Press, 2012. Print.
[1] Frankfurt uses the words “desire” and “want” interchangeably.
The Meaning of Freedom
February 18, 2014
Professor Randall Harp
According to Harry G. Frankfurt in Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, for a person to enjoy free will, “it means that he is free to will what he wants to will, or to have the will he wants” (15). Two conditions must be met in order for a given event to be a product of a person’s free will:
I should start by clarifying some key terms used in the above criteria. What exactly is a will? Furthermore, what does it mean for a will to be free?
A will is also known as an effective desire, or a desire that moves a person to act. A will is comprised of one or more first-order desires, which are “desires[1] to do or not to do one thing or another” (7). First-order desires are simply thoughts that we can act upon directly (to play piano or not to play piano, for example). A person may have multiple (and possibly conflicting) first-order desires at any given time, but the desire or combination of desires that makes them act is their effective desire, orwill. People also have what are called second-order volitions, which are mental situations in which we want a certain desire to be our will. When our second-order volition matches up with our effective desire, then our will is said to be free. We exercise free will when we are moved to act by the desire that we want to be moved to act by. I will try to clarify this with an example:
Imagine that Ellen is learning to play the piano. Ellen really enjoys playing the piano and wants to improve. She is visiting her aunt’s house, and her aunt owns a magnificent grand piano. When Ellen sees her aunt’s beautiful piano, she feels the urge to play it (Ellen has a first-order desire to play the piano). Ellen is trying to improve her piano playing, and she knows that the more often she practices, the better she will get. Thus, she wants to want to play the piano; that is, her second-order volition is to play the piano (she wants to be moved to act by her desire to play the piano). When she sits down on the bench and begins to play, her first-order desire becomes her effective desire (her will) because it is the one that moved her to act. Perhaps Ellen was hungry too, and so also had a first-order desire to eat, but she did not have time to both eat and play piano. Her desire to eat did not become her effective desire because it did not move her to act (she played piano instead of going to find food). So, Ellen’s will is free because her effective desire is to play the piano, and she wanted to be moved by her desire to play the piano. Ellen is playing the piano of her own free will because her effective desire matches her second-order volition. She was free “to have the will [s]he want[ed]” (15).
Looking back to the aforementioned conditions necessary for the exercise of free will, you will see that both stipulations have been met in Ellen’s case. It was her will to play piano (she wanted to do it and she did it) and her will was free when she played (she wanted to be moved to do it by her desire to do it). If it were the case that Ellen was being forced to play the piano even though she didn’t want to (if she was playing despite the fact that she had no first-order desire to do so), for instance, if her parents were making her practice OR ELSE, then her will (that which moved her to act) would not be her own, and she would not be playing as a result of her own free will.
As we have all experienced at one time or another in life, our actions do not always represent our intentions. For example, Walker may intend to quit smoking; however, he is addicted to cigarettes, and so smokes one anyway. He has two conflicting first-order desires (to smoke and to not smoke) and a second-order volition to not smoke (he wants his desire to not smoke to be his effective desire). Despite his intention to not smoke a cigarette, he submits to his addiction and smokes one anyway because his desire to not smoke is weaker than his conflicting desire to smoke. Thus, to smoke a cigarette is Walker’s effective desire, but his effective desire is not what he wanted it to be, and so does not equate to his second-order volition. Because of his addiction, he was not “free to will what he want[ed] to will” (15). Thus, Walker did not smoke a cigarette of his own free will. Although Walker’s effective desire (his will) ended up being to smoke, he did so only because he is helpless against his addiction to cigarettes. This situation is tied to the previous example in which Ellen’s parents force her to play piano against her will, for it cannot be said that Walker’s will is his own. In Frankfurt’s similar example of an unwilling addict, he states: “the force moving him to take the drug is a force other than his own, and that it is not of his own free will but rather against his will that this force moves him to take it” (13).
If the unwilling addict’s will is not his own, then what about the willing addict’s? Frankfurt explores this query too. Suppose that Walker does not intend to quit smoking; rather, he is addicted to cigarettes, but he thinks smoking is cool. He desires to smoke and wants to desire to smoke. He would have a first-order desire to smoke as well as a second-order volition to smoke. In this case, Walker’s will would not be freebecause he is helplessly addicted to cigarettes, and would smoke regardless of whether or not he had a second-order volition to do so. However, according to Frankfurt, Walker would smoke of his own free will in this scenario because he does want to desire smoke, wants to smoke a cigarette, and so smokes one. Thus, he makes his will his own. Walker’s will is out of his control, but is still his own because he has made it so. Unlike the unwilling addict, it is not only because of his addiction that the willing addict smokes.
According to Frankfurt’s definition of free will—“that [a person] is free to will what he wants to will, or to have the will he wants”—whether or not determinism exists is irrelevant. Even if everything is causally determined, and as Sam Harris would say, “our mental lives are simply given to us by the cosmos” it is still possible to have free will under Frankfurt’s definition of the term. However, if your definition of free will is that you must have absolute control of a thought, meaning that you must have been able to control your genetic makeup as well as all environmental factors that influenced the thought and resulting action, then people probably cannot possibly exercise what you call free will. In Frankfurt’s compatibilist argument, though, determinism and free will are not mutually exclusive. He says, “it seems conceivable that it should be causally determined that a person is free to want what he wants to want. If this is conceivable, then it might be causally determined that a person enjoys free will” (20).
Works Cited
Frankfurt, Harry G. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.”The Journal of Philosophy LXVIII.1 (1971): 5-20. JSTOR. Web. 20 Feb. 2014.
Harris, Sam. Free will. New York: Free Press, 2012. Print.
[1] Frankfurt uses the words “desire” and “want” interchangeably.