Mae DesTroismaisons
Controversies in Modern Genomics
September 11, 2013
Professor Tamera Williams
“The era of personal genomics is here,” says Philip Reilly, author of The Strongest Boy in the World, “[And] The cost of acquiring the information is going to continue to fall and the value of having it is going to continue to rise” (278). In light of this statement, we must keep in mind that in the modern world, technological advancement is occurring at a much faster rate than we are ethically prepared to deal with. That being said, the concept of genetic intervention for the enhancement of children is as much a philosophical issue as a scientific one, and requires deep pondering before being practiced.
Through whole-genome studies, researchers are making headway in regards to discovering the causes of health conditions like coronary artery disease, autism, ALS (Lou Gehrig’s disease), rheumatoid arthritis, diabetes, and multiple sclerosis, to name a few (Reilly 271), and not too many people would argue that this use of enhancement technology is immoral. But what about intervening for non-medical purposes? Should we use emerging science to extend beyond heath, that is, to become “better than well”?
Some common concerns regarding the enhancement of people (particularly children) via genetic intervention revolve around the ideas of autonomy, fairness, and individual rights. How can one justify selecting the traits that another human being will display? Could unenhanced individuals be disadvantaged as a result of their parents’ choice not to intervene? Perhaps this technology will even spark the emergence of two human subspecies: the enhanced and the only natural, as well a resulting socioeconomic divide between them. And what constitutes an “enhancement” anyway? Who gets to decide? The case of Nazi eugenics can be used as an example of the horrors that can occur if genetic enhancement is not properly stipulated.
Autonomy, Fairness, and Individual Rights
In an essay appearing in Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine, Julian Savulescu states that ethically, people not only could, but should choose to have themselves, and their children too, genetically improved to be more than simply healthy if given the means to. In fact, he thinks that notto do so would be lazy and/or neglectful. What kind of parent wouldn’t want their kids to be the best they could possibly be? “I believe that to be human is to be better,” he says, “Or, at least, to strive to be better” (828). In order to protect against infringement of liberty, harm to subjects, and genetic discrimination (geneticism), he has formulated the following safeguards, the final three of which are of particular relevance in the case of child enhancement (828):
Problem solved, right? Wrong. Even with the aforementioned safeguards, the idea of genetic intervention as a means for non-medical ends stillmakes people uncomfortable. But why? In a different essay found in the same anthology as Savulescu’s, Michael J. Sandel points out that autonomy, fairness, and individual values are not the only values that come into play in the controversy surrounding the genetic enhancement of children. In fact, he doesn’t even think that they are the true reasons why it makes people uneasy in the first place.
First, he reveals that the autonomy argument fails because it incorrectly implies that without a designer-parent, children are able to choose their traits themselves (829). It also cannot explain why we are still disconcerted by the idea of people seeking genetic treatment for themselves. He then uses the example of muscle enhancement in sports to show that fairness cannot be the real issue either, for “it has always been the case that some athletes are better endowed genetically than others, and yet we do not consider this to undermine the fairness of competitive sports” (830). Sandel also notes that although geneticism could potentially be a big problem, our concerns about discrimination are not actually in regards to the moral status of an enhancement itself, but rather are rooted in quandaries about equal access to the treatment, and so also cannot be the real cause of our hesitation (831). Additionally, he considers the argument that some enhancements, such as increasing height, would be self-defeating. “Like the fairness objection,” he writes, “it leaves unexamined the attitudes and dispositions that prompt the drive for enhancement…The real question is whether we want to live in a society where parents feel compelled to spend a fortune to make perfectly healthy kids a few inches taller” (831).
Humility, Responsibility, and Solidarity
Sandel believes that we are perturbed by the quest for genetic perfection for reasons relating to the values of humility, responsibility, and solidarity. He thinks that extending beyond health via genetic intervention would erode our gratitude for the giftedness of life while leading to an “explosion of responsibility” because enhancement technologies threaten to allow overambitious parents to get carried away. For these types of parents, it will cause humility to crumble as responsibility escalates to unhealthy levels. For their children, there will be enormous pressure to turn out the way they were envisioned, or designed to be (834-837).
A similar argument has been made to discourage cloning for reproductive purposes. An attempt to rebut it claims, “this will be true only if we allow it to be true” (Center for Genomics and Society, 2006). We have to remain realistic in our ponderings, though—we will allow it to be true. Actually, we already allow it to be true. Everyone knows that parent who tries to relive their high school days vicariously through their children by forcing them to play sports instead of joining glee club.
After much reflection on the subject, I have to agree with Sandel. I believe that the genetic enhancement of people, particularly children, is only morally permissible as a means for medical ends. That is, emerging enhancement technologies should only be used for the treatment and/or prevention of illness, and not to reach beyond health in vain to make people better than well.
Works Cited
Reilly, Philip R. “Personal Genomics.” The Strongest Boy in the World: How Genetic Information is Shaping Our Lives. Updated and Expanded ed. Cold Spring Harbor, New York: Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press, 2008. 271-278. Print.
“Reproductive Cloning Arguments Pro and Con.” CGS: Center for Genetics and Society. N.p. 15 May 2006. Web. 11 Sept. 2013. <http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/article.php?id=282>.
Sandel, Michael J. “The Case Against Perfection: What’s Wrong with Designer Children, Bionic Athletes, and Genetic Engineering.”Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine. Eighth ed. New York, New York: McGraw Hill, 2013. 829-838. Print.
Savulescu, Julian. “Genetic Interventions and the Ethics of Enhancement of Human Beings.” Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine. Eighth ed. New York, New York: McGraw Hill, 2013. 818-828. Print.
Controversies in Modern Genomics
September 11, 2013
Professor Tamera Williams
“The era of personal genomics is here,” says Philip Reilly, author of The Strongest Boy in the World, “[And] The cost of acquiring the information is going to continue to fall and the value of having it is going to continue to rise” (278). In light of this statement, we must keep in mind that in the modern world, technological advancement is occurring at a much faster rate than we are ethically prepared to deal with. That being said, the concept of genetic intervention for the enhancement of children is as much a philosophical issue as a scientific one, and requires deep pondering before being practiced.
Through whole-genome studies, researchers are making headway in regards to discovering the causes of health conditions like coronary artery disease, autism, ALS (Lou Gehrig’s disease), rheumatoid arthritis, diabetes, and multiple sclerosis, to name a few (Reilly 271), and not too many people would argue that this use of enhancement technology is immoral. But what about intervening for non-medical purposes? Should we use emerging science to extend beyond heath, that is, to become “better than well”?
Some common concerns regarding the enhancement of people (particularly children) via genetic intervention revolve around the ideas of autonomy, fairness, and individual rights. How can one justify selecting the traits that another human being will display? Could unenhanced individuals be disadvantaged as a result of their parents’ choice not to intervene? Perhaps this technology will even spark the emergence of two human subspecies: the enhanced and the only natural, as well a resulting socioeconomic divide between them. And what constitutes an “enhancement” anyway? Who gets to decide? The case of Nazi eugenics can be used as an example of the horrors that can occur if genetic enhancement is not properly stipulated.
Autonomy, Fairness, and Individual Rights
In an essay appearing in Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine, Julian Savulescu states that ethically, people not only could, but should choose to have themselves, and their children too, genetically improved to be more than simply healthy if given the means to. In fact, he thinks that notto do so would be lazy and/or neglectful. What kind of parent wouldn’t want their kids to be the best they could possibly be? “I believe that to be human is to be better,” he says, “Or, at least, to strive to be better” (828). In order to protect against infringement of liberty, harm to subjects, and genetic discrimination (geneticism), he has formulated the following safeguards, the final three of which are of particular relevance in the case of child enhancement (828):
- The enhancement in question must be in the seeker’s best interests.
- The enhancement procedure must be safe.
- It must increase the possibility of the person having “the best life,” according to a plausible definition of that that is.
- It must increase (or at least not decrease) the person’s life opportunities, or “range of possible lives”.
- It has to be widely available and affordable to all.
- It cannot put others at an unfair competitive disadvantage. (Savulescu uses the example of mind reading here.)
- It must not define the person. That is, their achievements need to be attributable to other factors and not directly to the enhancement.
- It cannot foster unjust discrimination and inequality, such as racism or economic disparity.
- An intervention may occur only if it cannot wait until the person receiving it has the ability to make the choice themself.
- It has to be plausibly in the interests of the person subjected to it
- It must not discourage autonomy or self-development in the person.
Problem solved, right? Wrong. Even with the aforementioned safeguards, the idea of genetic intervention as a means for non-medical ends stillmakes people uncomfortable. But why? In a different essay found in the same anthology as Savulescu’s, Michael J. Sandel points out that autonomy, fairness, and individual values are not the only values that come into play in the controversy surrounding the genetic enhancement of children. In fact, he doesn’t even think that they are the true reasons why it makes people uneasy in the first place.
First, he reveals that the autonomy argument fails because it incorrectly implies that without a designer-parent, children are able to choose their traits themselves (829). It also cannot explain why we are still disconcerted by the idea of people seeking genetic treatment for themselves. He then uses the example of muscle enhancement in sports to show that fairness cannot be the real issue either, for “it has always been the case that some athletes are better endowed genetically than others, and yet we do not consider this to undermine the fairness of competitive sports” (830). Sandel also notes that although geneticism could potentially be a big problem, our concerns about discrimination are not actually in regards to the moral status of an enhancement itself, but rather are rooted in quandaries about equal access to the treatment, and so also cannot be the real cause of our hesitation (831). Additionally, he considers the argument that some enhancements, such as increasing height, would be self-defeating. “Like the fairness objection,” he writes, “it leaves unexamined the attitudes and dispositions that prompt the drive for enhancement…The real question is whether we want to live in a society where parents feel compelled to spend a fortune to make perfectly healthy kids a few inches taller” (831).
Humility, Responsibility, and Solidarity
Sandel believes that we are perturbed by the quest for genetic perfection for reasons relating to the values of humility, responsibility, and solidarity. He thinks that extending beyond health via genetic intervention would erode our gratitude for the giftedness of life while leading to an “explosion of responsibility” because enhancement technologies threaten to allow overambitious parents to get carried away. For these types of parents, it will cause humility to crumble as responsibility escalates to unhealthy levels. For their children, there will be enormous pressure to turn out the way they were envisioned, or designed to be (834-837).
A similar argument has been made to discourage cloning for reproductive purposes. An attempt to rebut it claims, “this will be true only if we allow it to be true” (Center for Genomics and Society, 2006). We have to remain realistic in our ponderings, though—we will allow it to be true. Actually, we already allow it to be true. Everyone knows that parent who tries to relive their high school days vicariously through their children by forcing them to play sports instead of joining glee club.
After much reflection on the subject, I have to agree with Sandel. I believe that the genetic enhancement of people, particularly children, is only morally permissible as a means for medical ends. That is, emerging enhancement technologies should only be used for the treatment and/or prevention of illness, and not to reach beyond health in vain to make people better than well.
Works Cited
Reilly, Philip R. “Personal Genomics.” The Strongest Boy in the World: How Genetic Information is Shaping Our Lives. Updated and Expanded ed. Cold Spring Harbor, New York: Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press, 2008. 271-278. Print.
“Reproductive Cloning Arguments Pro and Con.” CGS: Center for Genetics and Society. N.p. 15 May 2006. Web. 11 Sept. 2013. <http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/article.php?id=282>.
Sandel, Michael J. “The Case Against Perfection: What’s Wrong with Designer Children, Bionic Athletes, and Genetic Engineering.”Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine. Eighth ed. New York, New York: McGraw Hill, 2013. 829-838. Print.
Savulescu, Julian. “Genetic Interventions and the Ethics of Enhancement of Human Beings.” Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine. Eighth ed. New York, New York: McGraw Hill, 2013. 818-828. Print.