Mae DesTroismaisons
The Meaning of Freedom
March 30, 2014
Professor Randall Harp
In his essay, “Hard Incompatibilism” Derk Pereboom states: “Accepting hard incompatibilism requires denying our ordinary views of ourselves as blameworthy for immoral actions and praiseworthy for actions that are morally exemplary” (114). Note that he is not suggesting that right and wrong could not exist in a world without moral responsibility, but only that people could not be held responsible for their actions, regardless of their moral status. He writes that if hard incompatibilism is true, we must find ways to deal with people who have acted immorally that focus on “moral admonition and encouragement, which presuppose only that the offender has done wrong” (115). Pereboom does not think that dangerous criminals should be punished with life sentences in violent prisons or by the death penalty. Rather, he defends a quarantine theory, which treats people who are threats to society’s well being similarly to people who carry contagious, life-threatening diseases.
Pereboom contends that if hard incompatibilism is true, then a retributivist or punitive system of criminal justice is wrong because it views criminals as blameworthy for their wrongdoings and deserving of pain, suffering, or deprivation in order to repent. He also points out a well-known fact: criminal punishment does not morally educate people who have acted immorally. Furthermore, he states, “even if we had good evidence that punishment was effective in morally educating criminals, we should prefer non-punitive methods for achieving this result, if they are available—whether or not criminals are morally responsible” (115).
Pereboom argues that deterrence theories, which claim that punitive methods of criminal justice are justified because they help prevent future crime, are flawed as well. Although not threatened by hard incompatibilism, deterrence theories like the utilitarian view and the self-defense view are weak in other ways. First, the utilitarian view is objectionable because it suggests that if punishing innocent people could prove beneficial or useful to society, then doing so would be justified. For example, if a person was found to be genetically predisposed to commit violent acts, but was raised in an environment that did not tolerate violence (and so the person had never committed a violent crime), then according to the utilitarian perspective, it would be permissible to punish them on the grounds that they could potentiallyharm others in the future. Second, the self-defense view authorizes the punishing of criminals in order to protect people from immediate threats. Pereboom, however, points out that at the time of sentencing, one is “typically not an immediate threat to anyone, and this fact about his circumstances distinguishes him from those who may legitimately be harmed on the basis the right of self-defense” (115).
The quarantine theory that Pereboom endorses is threatened neither by hard incompatibilism nor by the problems that arise from deterrence theories. He asserts that we can justify quarantining the criminally dangerous for the same reason we have the right to isolate people who pose a threat to society by being sick with dangerous and contagious diseases. If hard incompatibilism is true, then a criminal is no more responsible for his crimes than a person is responsible for contracting a deadly transmittable illness. Pereboom uses the serial killer example to demonstrate this point: even if he isn’t morally responsible for his murders, it would be legitimate to detain a serial killer who continues to be a threat to society in the same way that it would be legitimate to quarantine a carrier of an infectious disease who is not responsible for contracting it (116). We do not punish people for carrying communicable diseases, so why should we punish wrongdoers who are not morally responsible? According to Pereboom, we should cause no more harm to criminals than is necessary to “neutralize the danger posed by them” (116).
Pereboom’s quarantine theory places and emphasis on rehabilitation and moral admonition, as he believes that society has the duty try to rehabilitate criminals in the same sense that we have the duty to try to cure people with severe contagious diseases. Thus, the quarantine theory does not justify capitol punishment or “confinement in the worst prisons we have” (116). In a world without moral responsibility, if criminal rehabilitation proves impossible and indefinite detainment is necessary to protect the rest of society, then “there would be no justification for making a criminal’s life more miserable than the protection of society requires” (116). Although Pereboom’s quarantine theory does not satisfy the natural human desire to take revenge on those who have wronged us, it does seems strong enough to adequately handle all of the cases we need a criminal justice system to settle.
The Meaning of Freedom
March 30, 2014
Professor Randall Harp
In his essay, “Hard Incompatibilism” Derk Pereboom states: “Accepting hard incompatibilism requires denying our ordinary views of ourselves as blameworthy for immoral actions and praiseworthy for actions that are morally exemplary” (114). Note that he is not suggesting that right and wrong could not exist in a world without moral responsibility, but only that people could not be held responsible for their actions, regardless of their moral status. He writes that if hard incompatibilism is true, we must find ways to deal with people who have acted immorally that focus on “moral admonition and encouragement, which presuppose only that the offender has done wrong” (115). Pereboom does not think that dangerous criminals should be punished with life sentences in violent prisons or by the death penalty. Rather, he defends a quarantine theory, which treats people who are threats to society’s well being similarly to people who carry contagious, life-threatening diseases.
Pereboom contends that if hard incompatibilism is true, then a retributivist or punitive system of criminal justice is wrong because it views criminals as blameworthy for their wrongdoings and deserving of pain, suffering, or deprivation in order to repent. He also points out a well-known fact: criminal punishment does not morally educate people who have acted immorally. Furthermore, he states, “even if we had good evidence that punishment was effective in morally educating criminals, we should prefer non-punitive methods for achieving this result, if they are available—whether or not criminals are morally responsible” (115).
Pereboom argues that deterrence theories, which claim that punitive methods of criminal justice are justified because they help prevent future crime, are flawed as well. Although not threatened by hard incompatibilism, deterrence theories like the utilitarian view and the self-defense view are weak in other ways. First, the utilitarian view is objectionable because it suggests that if punishing innocent people could prove beneficial or useful to society, then doing so would be justified. For example, if a person was found to be genetically predisposed to commit violent acts, but was raised in an environment that did not tolerate violence (and so the person had never committed a violent crime), then according to the utilitarian perspective, it would be permissible to punish them on the grounds that they could potentiallyharm others in the future. Second, the self-defense view authorizes the punishing of criminals in order to protect people from immediate threats. Pereboom, however, points out that at the time of sentencing, one is “typically not an immediate threat to anyone, and this fact about his circumstances distinguishes him from those who may legitimately be harmed on the basis the right of self-defense” (115).
The quarantine theory that Pereboom endorses is threatened neither by hard incompatibilism nor by the problems that arise from deterrence theories. He asserts that we can justify quarantining the criminally dangerous for the same reason we have the right to isolate people who pose a threat to society by being sick with dangerous and contagious diseases. If hard incompatibilism is true, then a criminal is no more responsible for his crimes than a person is responsible for contracting a deadly transmittable illness. Pereboom uses the serial killer example to demonstrate this point: even if he isn’t morally responsible for his murders, it would be legitimate to detain a serial killer who continues to be a threat to society in the same way that it would be legitimate to quarantine a carrier of an infectious disease who is not responsible for contracting it (116). We do not punish people for carrying communicable diseases, so why should we punish wrongdoers who are not morally responsible? According to Pereboom, we should cause no more harm to criminals than is necessary to “neutralize the danger posed by them” (116).
Pereboom’s quarantine theory places and emphasis on rehabilitation and moral admonition, as he believes that society has the duty try to rehabilitate criminals in the same sense that we have the duty to try to cure people with severe contagious diseases. Thus, the quarantine theory does not justify capitol punishment or “confinement in the worst prisons we have” (116). In a world without moral responsibility, if criminal rehabilitation proves impossible and indefinite detainment is necessary to protect the rest of society, then “there would be no justification for making a criminal’s life more miserable than the protection of society requires” (116). Although Pereboom’s quarantine theory does not satisfy the natural human desire to take revenge on those who have wronged us, it does seems strong enough to adequately handle all of the cases we need a criminal justice system to settle.